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Abstract
This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary
policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where govern-
ments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding
to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink signi…cantly
the set of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The issue of the distribution of roles and, consequently, equilibrium selection in
non-cooperative games has been largely investigated in the literature on oligopolis-
tic interaction. In quantity games, leadership is preferred to simultaneous play,
and both are preferred to followership, while in price games followership is pre-
ferred to leadership and both are preferred to simultaneous play (see Gal-Or,
1985; Dowrick, 1986; Boyer and Moreaux, 1987a,b, inter alia).1 In this literature,
though, the sequence of moves is exogenously determined, and there emerges no
reason to believe that players select the Nash solution rather than the Stackelberg
one, or vice versa.
A recent contribution (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990; HS henceforth) explicitly
models the strategic choice of timing, which is often possible in reality. HS inves-
tigate the endogenous choice of roles, i.e., the endogenous arising of Stackelberg
or Cournot equilibria, in non-cooperative two-person games, by considering an
extended game where players must set both the actions they want to undertake in
the basic game, and the time at which such actions will be implemented. When
players choose to move at di¤erent times, sequential equilibria are observed, while
if they decide to act at the same time, simultaneous Nash equilibria obtain. The
choice of timing occurs in a preplay stage which is not taking place in real time,
so that there is no need of discounting the payo¤s. The decision to play early or
late is not su¢cient per se to yield sequential play.
The range of applicability of such a framework is extremely wide. Here, I
shall focus on the issue of the international coordination of monetary policies. A
variety of models have been described in the relevant literature, with either …xed
or ‡exible exchange rates/prices (see Mundell, 1968; Hamada, 1976, 1979, 1985;
Canzoneri and Gray, 1983, 1985; Cooper, 1985; Turnovsky and D’Orey, 1986;
Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991). All of these models highlight the strategic as-
pects of the interdependence between national economic policies, complaining at
the same time the lack of a mechanism allowing for the selection of a speci…c equi-
librium in each of the situations described. Moreover, non-cooperative behaviour
generates externalities that are likely to lead to ine¢cient outcomes for all the
countries involved. A remedy to the ine¢ciency due to strictly non-cooperative
solutions consists in considering the possibility that governments succeed in reach-
ing cooperative agreements in a repeated-game setting, thereby internalizing ex-
ternalities in a way that all countries might bene…t. As a consequence, it has
often been argued that policy-makers should be forced to accept a set of rules
that implicitly establish a coordination amongst their policies. Unfortunately,
1The same conclusions on the preferences over the distribution of roles can be reached
through a quick examination of the slopes of the reaction functions, de…ning the concept of
strategic complementarity/substitutability (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985).
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the feasibility of such a cooperative arrangement is largely questionable, in that
there always exists an inherent incentive to defect from it. Likewise, one or all
countries may be better o¤ in Stackelberg equilibria than in the simultaneous
equilibrium, but this solutions are a¤ected by the same credibility problems as a
cooperative agreement. The commitment to adopt a particular policy di¤erent
from the Nash equilibrium one, on the part of one or more policy-makers, can
hardly be credible in single-stage, one-shot games.
In this paper, I intend to show that the instruments provided by HS allow to
signi…cantly shrink the set of admissible equilibria for the basic one-shot game,
when the possibility for governments to set the timing of their respective moves
is duly taken into account. This is likely to happen whenever policy-makers can
take their decisions through the intervention of supernational organizations. It
is particularly worth stressing that the mechanism envisaged here to extend the
basic game does not require any cooperative attitude on their part. Moreover,
they are not required to take precommitments, in that the game is conceived in
such a fashion that they have no incentive to deviate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
nature of the extended game with observable delay. Section 3 introduces a simple
…xed-price and …xed-exchange rate Keynesian setting. The issue of coordinating
monetary policy across countries is then dealt with in section 4. Finally, section
…ve provides concluding comments.
2 The extended game with observable delay
In HS, a simple two-person non-cooperative one-stage game is extended by al-
lowing players to choose also the timing of their respective actions in the basic
game. If they choose to move at di¤erent times, the one playing later observes
the move selected by the player who has played …rst. This leads to the arising of
a sequential equilibrium in the basic game. If instead both choose to move at the
same time, then a simultaneous equilibrium is observed. HS consider the stage
of choosing the timing as a preplay stage which is not taking place in real time,
so that there is no need of discounting the payo¤s pertaining to the basic game.
The structure of the extended game is as follows. First, players announce
the instant at which they will undertake their actions. They are committed to
that timing, although they do not specify which action they shall take. Then,
they proceed to play by undertaking the sequence of actions they …nd optimal,
knowing when the rival is going to move.
Consider an extended game where players can set a single strategic variable
and must choose between moving …rst or second.2 I shall adopt here a symbology
2Notice that players are not required to commit to a particular action in the basic game.
HS (1990, section IV) take into account the latter possibility in describing an extended game
with action commitment, where each player announces a speci…c action and must stick to it,
whether the rival tries to lead or follow. This yields multiple equilibria.
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which is largely analogous to that in HS (1990, p.32). De…ne ¡1 = (N;§1;U1) the
extended game with observable delay. The set of players (or …rms) isN = fA;Bg,
and ® and ¯ are the compact and convex intervals of R1 representing the actions
available to A and B in the basic game. U1 is the payo¤ function. Payo¤s depend
on the actions undertaken in the latter, according to the following functions,
UA : ® £ ¯ ! R1 and UB : ® £ ¯ ! R1. Let U i; i = A;B; be monotone in the
rival’s action.3 The set of times at which …rms can choose to move is T = fF; Sg,
i.e., …rst or second. The set of strategies for player i is §i1 = fF; Sg £ ©i,
where ©i is the set of functions that map fT £ ¯(or ®)g into ®(or ¯). If both
players choose to move at the same time, they obtain the payo¤s associated with
the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, (UAn ; U
B
n ), otherwise they get the payo¤s
associated with the Stackelberg equilibrium, e.g., (UAl ; U
B
f ) if A moves …rst and
B moves second, or vice versa. The game can be described in normal form as in
matrix 1 (cfr. HS, 1990, p.33).
B
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Matrix 1
Examine …rst the cases where both players’ payo¤ ranking is the same. To
begin with, consider the following sequence:
U il > U
i
n > U
i
f ; i = A;B: (1)
This holds, e.g., in a standard Cournot duopoly with substitute goods (see Singh
and Vives, 1984). In such a case, both players move at the earliest occasion in
order to avoid following, and the subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended
game involves simultaneous moves (HS, 1990, Theorem II). If we have instead:
U if > U
i
l > U
i
n; i = A;B; (2)
as in a standard Bertrand duopoly with substitute goods (see Singh and Vives,
1984), the extended game with observable delay has multiple equilibria, in that
both sequential play equilibria of the basic game are subgame perfect (HS, 1990,
Theorem III). Moreover, there exist also a correlated equilibrium4 and a mixed-
strategy equilibrium where players randomize over F and S, so that they attach
a positive probability to simultaneous play.
3Monotonicity of the best reply functions is not su¢cient for HS’s theorems to hold generally.
This has been pointed out by Amir (1995).
4For the concept of correlated equilibrium, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), ch. 3.
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Finally, consider the asymmetric case where payo¤ rankings di¤er across play-
ers:
U il > U
i
n > U
i
f ;U
j
f > U
j
l > U
j
n; i; j = A;B; i 6= j: (3)
In this setting, player i strictly prefers leading, while player j strictly prefers
following, so that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game
involves sequential play and is described by the pair (F;S). This is what happens
in a duopoly where one …rm is a quantity-setter and the other is a price-setter
(Singh and Vives, 1984).
In the existing literature the issue of the distribution of roles has been solely
investigated in relation to oligopoly. In the next section, I propose an example
of what can be achieved by adopting HS’s approach in a well known model of
monetary policy.
3 A simple Keynesian setting
I borrow the basic setting from Hamada (1985). Assume the world economy
consists of two countries, A and B, connected by international trade and free
capital ‡ows. They are of comparable size and have the same economic system.
The price level in each country, pi, i=A, B, is …xed, while the income level Y i is
variable. Exchange rates are also …xed.5 The money market is in equilibrium in
each country if real money supply and demand coincide:
M i
pi
= Li(ri; Y i); (4)
where Li is the money demand expressed by agents living in country i, as a
function of the real interest rate and income. The nominal money supply in
country i consists of the sum of international reserves, Ri, and the liabilities of
the banking system, Di:
M i = Ri +Di; (5)
where the price of country i ’s currency in terms of country j ’s currency has been
normalized to one without loss of generality. Total international reserves are
assumed to be constant in the short run:
RA +RB = W: (6)
Moreover, provided price levels are …xed, nominal and real interest rates coincide,
and perfect capital mobility implies rA = rB.
Monetary policy takes the form of a change in the liabilities of the banking
system, i.e., domestic credit Di. Mundell (1968) established that the following
5For an exhaustive discussion of the opportunity of …xing exchange rates or limiting the
degree of their ‡exibility, see Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988).
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Figure 1: Country A’s indi¤erence curves map
comparative statics properties hold:
@Y i
@Di
> 0;
@Y i
@Dj
> 0;
@Ri
@Di
< 0;
@Ri
@Dj
> 0: (7)
Assume government spending is constant. Under …xed exchange rates, each
country’s problem consists in choosing the optimal monetary policy, under the
hypothesis that its welfare depends on the current condition of its real income
and balance of payments, represented by international reserves. Accordingly,
country’s i objective function can be represented as U i = U i(Y i; Ri). To our
aims, in order to explicitly model strategic interaction between the two countries,
it is more convenient to rewrite such objective function as follows:
U i = U i(Di;Dj); (8)
i.e., in terms of both countries’ domestic credit. I shall assume that there U i is
single-peaked and at least quasi-concave for all admissible values of Di and Dj .
Hence, country i’s objective function can be represented by a map of indi¤erence
curves, as in Figure 1, where the indi¤erence curves mapping of country A is
illustrated. Its satisfaction level decreases as country i departs from its maximum
point Hi.
I am now in a position to investigate the interplay between the monetary
policies of the two countries, expressed in terms of the levels of their respective
domestic credit, Di. This is done in the next section.
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4 The monetary policy game
I shall now proceed to present the relevant cases without going into a detailed
analytical treatment. Consider …rst the situation where both countries prefer
a balance of payments surplus. This setting is depicted in Figure 2. Provided
that countries are symmetric, the 45-degree line OB de…nes the locus of all the
combinations of DA and DB that equilibrate the balance of payments for both
countries, BPA = BPB = 0. Thus, above and to the left of OB, country A runs a
surplus, while below and to the right of OB, country A runs a de…cit. The opposite
obviously holds for country B. Country A’s indi¤erence curves map is drawn with
solid lines, while country B ’s is dashed. The nature of the strategic interaction is
described by the slope of the reaction functions, GA = gA(DB) andGB = gB(DA).
Their intersection along OB gives the Nash equilibrium pair (DAn ;D
B
n ). The
tangency point between country i ’s map and country j ’s reaction point identi…es
the Stackelberg equilibrium point Si(Dil ;D
j
f ) where country i takes the lead and
country j follows. Since the reaction functions are both decreasing, and both
countries order the payo¤s as in (1) above, the outcome of the extended game
can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When both countries prefer a balance of payments surplus and
exhibit decreasing reaction functions, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the ex-
tended game involves simultaneous play.
Here the situation is such that it would pay to be the leader, but the other
country would incur a signi…cant loss accepting to follow. Since by moving at the
…rst occasion both governments can avoid the burden of followership, a simulta-
neous equilibrium obtains. Due to the presence of a strictly dominant strategy,
i.e., playing at the earliest occasion (which shapes the negative slope of both
reaction functions), the ine¢cient outcome associated with the Nash equilibrium
generated by simultaneous play, which typically replicates the prisoner’s dilemma,
cannot be improved upon in any way other than cooperative behaviour.
Consider now a situation where both countries prefer a balance of payments
de…cit. Here, both countries exhibit increasing reaction functions. A quick in-
spection of Figure 3 reveals that this leads to a Nash equilibrium characterized
by an expansive distortion. Moreover, both countries rank simultaneous and
sequential outcomes as in (2) above.
Analogous considerations hold when in the asymmetric setting where, e.g.,
country A desires a balance of payments de…cit while country B desires a lim-
ited surplus, as illustrated in Figure 4. Again, the ranking is described by (2).
Accordingly, I can state what follows:
Proposition 2 When at least one country prefers a balance of payments de…cit
and both countries exhibit increasing reaction functions, the extended game with
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Figure 2: The symmetric setting where both countries prefer a surplus
Figure 3: The symmetric setting where both countries prefer a de…cit
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Figure 4: The asymmetric case where A desires a de…cit and B desires a surplus
observable delay exhibits multiple equilibria. There exist two equilibria in pure
strategies entailing sequential play. Moreover, there exist (i) a mixed-strategy
equilibria where countries randomize over playing early and delaying, so that they
play simultaneously with positive probability, and (ii) a correlated equilibrium.
In such a setting, the leader’s role is still preferred by both countries, but
following turns out to be preferable to playing simultaneously. As a consequence,
the clearly suboptimal simultaneous Nash equilibrium is ruled out, at least in pure
strategies. Notice that the absence of a dominant strategy generates the need to
coordinate. The fact that playing in mixed strategies entails attaching a positive
probability to moving simultaneously, leads one to think that countries could
alternatively play the leader’s role in a repeated game. This is precisely what
would happen if the solution concept were the correlated equilibrium, where each
country’s utility level is the weighted sum of the leader’s and follower’s payo¤s,
with weights equal to 1/2.
Finally, consider the setting where one country desires a surplus while the
other desires a de…cit, and their objective functions are such that the reaction
functions are characterized by opposite slopes.
In Figure 5, country A prefers a balance of payments surplus and has a de-
creasing reaction function, while country B desires a balance of payments de…cit
and has an increasing reaction function. The exam of Figure 5 reveals that coun-
try A is better o¤ moving second than in any other situation, while country B is
better o¤ playing …rst than in any other situation. Moreover, country B prefers
simultaneous play to followership, while country A prefers both leadership and
8
Figure 5: The asymmetric case where reaction functions have opposite slopes
followership to simultaneous play. This is precisely the situation described by (3).
Accordingly, the outcome of such a game can be summarized by the following:
Proposition 3 When at least one country prefers a balance of payments de…cit
and the two countries’ reaction functions exhibit opposite slopes, the extended
game with observable delay has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which is in
pure strategies and involves sequential moves, with the country characterized by
an increasing reaction function in the leader’s position.
Here, the country characterized by an increasing reaction function (in this
example, B) has a strictly dominant strategy consisting in playing immediately,
while the country with a decreasing reaction function (A) has no dominant strat-
egy. This yields as a result a unique equilibrium for the extended game, which
drastically di¤ers, though, from the simultaneous equilibrium of the basic game
corresponding to the intersection of the reaction functions. It is worth noting
that this is the only case where both countries’ desires turn out to be ful…lled at
equilibrium. In the Stackelberg equilibrium point SB, country B is leading and
running a de…cit, while country A is following and running a surplus, so that the
extension of the basic monetary policy game to consider a preplay stage where
countries establish the order of moves provides a clearcut answer to the problem
of the multiplicity of equilibria that characterized the earlier literature in this
…eld.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have reformulated the issue of the international coordination of
monetary policies within the extended game framework due to HS. I have thus
shown that accounting for the possibility for governments to set the timing of
their respective actions before proceeding to determine their respective monetary
policy leads to a signi…cant shrinking of the set of equilibria. Such a possibility is
very likely to arise where supernational organizations can intervene in the process
of coordinating national policies. Speci…cally, the most striking result is that
when countries have opposite and non-con‡icting interests, the equilibrium of
the extended game is unique and completely ful…lls their respective desires. Such
a result was far beyond the reach of standard single-stage models, which were
a¤ected by the lack of an equilibrium selection mechanism. The solution consisted
in resorting to repeated-game settings where endogenous cooperation could arise
(see Hamada, 1985, ch. 4; Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991, ch.2). Here, instead,
outcomes that Pareto-dominate the Nash equilibrium can be reached in one-shot
games, through strictly non-cooperative behaviour.
I con…ned my attention to a simple Keynesian setting, under the assumptions
of …xed prices and …xed exchange rates, in order to illustrate the results that
can be reached by resorting to the tool kit provided by HS. The replication of
such analysis in a setting characterized by ‡exible exchange rates and prices (see
Cooper, 1985; Hamada, 1985, chs. 4 and 5; Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991,
ch.2) is straightforward and would lead to largely analogous conclusions.
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